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Abstract 
 
We compare the efficiency with which management discretion and 
shareholder choice regulate hostile tender offers.  This is the first paper in 
a long running debate that rigorously compares these legal rules to 
analyze both the critical informational assumptions and the interplay of 
those assumptions with principles of financial market efficiency.  A critical 
innovation of our model is its focus on an informed management’s choice 
among alternative corporate policies under the protection of the business 
judgment rule, but where agency costs exist. We assume that corporate 
assets and reinvestment opportunities are efficiently priced by financial 
markets, but that markets never learn the value of foregone investments.  
In this case, shareholder choice may create an agency problem whereby 
managers forego positive net present value investments that increase the 
risk of a hostile bid. We are able to determine analytic conditions under 
which the expected cost of this agency problem exceeds that of the 
standard agency problem usually identified with management discretion. 
 
 
 In this paper we explore again the efficient legal rule to govern hostile tender 
offers.1  Most of our discussion involves the choice between two stylized legal regimes— 
management discretion, a position associated with that of the Delaware courts,2 and    
shareholder choice, a position long favored by most legal academic commentators.3  The 
question posed by the academic commentators, in particular, by Ronald Gilson is whether 
the Delaware rule has a coherent justification for favoring management discretion (Gilson 
2001).4    
 
 More recently, commentators have come to the defense of management 
discretion.  Michael Wachter (2003), in answering the question posed by Ronald Gilson 
(2001) argued that management discretion is superior to shareholder choice if financial 
markets have transitory departures from efficiency and informed managers react to a 
shareholder choice regime by managing to the market.  In the example offered by 
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Wachter (2003) informed managers adopt corporate policies that the managers believe to 
be inferior but are favored by the market.  In a Penn Law symposium on Corporate 
Control Transactions, Richard Kihlstrom and Wachter (2003) modeled the managing to 
the market phenomenon, showing under what conditions management discretion was 
superior to shareholder choice.  We argue that under shareholder choice managers have 
an incentive to adopt takeover defenses prior to the emergence of a takeover bid and that 
these are effective defenses that courts cannot regulate because they are protected by the 
presumption of the business judgment rule and are not subject to Unocal/Unitrin scrutiny. 
 
 Two other papers presented at that symposium offered complementary 
justifications of management discretion (Kahan and Rock, 2003; Arlen and Talley, 
2003).5  A major question that remained unanswered after the symposium was the extent 
to which a conclusion favoring shareholder choice rests on assumptions about financial 
market inefficiencies.    
 
 In this paper we assume strong-form efficiency as that term is generally 
understood.  Specifically, we assume that investors know the present value of the free 
cash flow generated by the firm’s existing assets and the reinvestment returns generated 
by those future free cash flows.6  We assume strong-form efficiency because that 
assumption is the most favorable to the shareholder choice position.7  The question 
answered in this paper is the extent to which critiques of shareholder choice ultimately 
rest on failures in financial market efficiency. 
 
 Our answer is that strong-form efficiency is not sufficient to provide 
unambiguous support for a shareholder choice legal regime.  The reason, as we discuss in 
earlier papers, is that managers have the ability to choose among corporate policies in a 
manner that reduces the probability of a takeover in ways that are undetected or even 
sanctioned by the financial markets.  We focus on corporate policy because the choice 
among corporate policy opportunities is the central function of the managers and the 
decision that is most likely to have a significant effect on the market value of the 
corporation.   
 
 Modeling corporate policy as the cornerstone in the analysis is also useful because 
the Delaware courts’ most persistent argument in favor of their takeover law doctrine is 
the need to protect the ability of managers to adopt policies that maximize the value of 
the corporation and the shareholders’ interest.  Although a management discretion regime 
may be favored for reasons unconnected with the Delaware courts’ reasoning, we show 
that, in fact, the Delaware courts’ position is consistent with the argument that we 
develop.      
 
 While financial markets may become strong-form efficient when pricing the value 
of the corporation based on its current corporate policies and assets, markets are not as 
well informed as are managers about new corporate policy opportunities.  In particular, if 
corporate policy opportunities are not adopted, markets have no way of knowing what the 
firm’s value would have been had the policy been adopted.  Thus managers can, if it is in 
their interest, forgo policies that they know to be value enhancing.  Such a maneuver 
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might be in the managers’ interest if the adoption of the policies would increase the 
chance of a hostile tender offer.  The maneuver is not self-defeating because it does not 
get built into the market price.  More formally, there are informational asymmetries 
inherent in the fact that managers are more informed about how to best conduct the 
business and affairs of the incorporation, and not all of this information becomes publicly 
disclosed.  
 
 On the other hand, if the financial markets could incorporate the possibility of 
future corporate policy opportunities, they could discount the firm’s value to reflect the 
costs of this agency problem.  However, to assume that the market knows the value of all 
corporate policy options that might be forgone in the future and can incorporate this into 
share prices is to assume a kind of hyper-efficiency that goes well beyond strong-form 
efficiency.   Financial markets might be hyper-efficient in the way we use the term, but 
there is no evidence that this is so.     
 
 As a consequence, in periods prior to the emergence of a hostile bid, when 
management decisions are protected by the presumption of the business judgment rule, 
managers could adopt those corporate policies that best provide them with protection 
against takeovers instead of adopting the corporate policies that maximize the value of 
the corporation.  We argue that whereas managers may act in this way in a shareholder 
choice legal regime, they have no apparent reason to act in this manner in a management 
discretion legal regime.  This is an agency cost of a shareholder choice regime that we 
discussed in our earlier paper and that had not been incorporated into earlier models of 
shareholder choice.   
 
 In this paper, by explicitly modeling the agency cost problem and allowing for 
synergistic bidders, we can provide an explicit representation of when shareholder choice 
or management discretion is the efficient rule.   We assume that management discretion 
allows for higher agency costs than does shareholder choice, and that the private benefits 
under management discretion are the maximum benefits that managers can extract 
without violating their duty of loyalty.  The efficiency tradeoff then turns on whether the 
loss associated with a less than optimal corporate policy is larger or smaller than the 
higher agency costs associated with management discretion.   
 
 We also extend our analysis to take account of an alternative legal rule that can 
fall between shareholder choice and complete management discretion.  This rule, for 
example, would capture a regime that both facilitated a bidder’s ability to wage a proxy 
contest for control of the firm and provided heightened scrutiny that restricted managers’ 
ability to alter the voting rules in their favor.  We show that under certain conditions, 
such a regime is unambiguously inferior to either management discretion or shareholder 
choice because it may increase the cost of a bid while not encouraging managers to 
maximize the value of the firm.   
 
1. Incomplete Information and the Choice of a Legal Regime 
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In this section we focus on the informational issues that help determine the 
efficient legal rule for governing hostile tender offers.  Given the complexity of the issues 
and their importance to the workings of any model of takeover defenses we describe them 
in some detail.   
 
Informational issues are at the core of any analysis of the allocation of power 
between shareholders and directors.  It is generally agreed that managers know more than 
investors as to how to conduct the business and affairs of the corporation; a principle that 
provides the basis for the business judgment rule presumption that protects directors’ 
ability to make largely unchallengeable business judgments.8   No one contests the 
conclusion that the choice among corporate policies has to be made by managers and not 
by shareholders.   It is also generally agreed that the separation of ownership and control 
means that managers may act for their own private benefit rather than as faithful 
fiduciaries and thus not maximize the value of the corporation.  This creates the classic 
corporate law dilemma: if managers are given unconstrained authority they may act in 
their own interest, yet if their authority is too constrained they may be unable to adopt the 
corporate policies that they know are best for the corporation.9   
 
 It is often argued that this problem becomes unimportant if capital markets are 
efficient in the strong sense. When markets are strong-form efficient, then the financial 
market and hence shareholders know as much about the value of the firm as do managers.   
However, the evidence to support this assumption is scanty, with the empirical evidence 
providing better support for semi-strong-form efficiency.  A convenient and plausible 
assumption is that capital markets become strong-form efficient in the midst of the 
disclosure-rich environment of takeover battles.10   Because a task of this paper is to 
explore the importance of strong-form efficiency in the debate over the appropriate 
takeover defense policy, we adopt the assumption that financial markets are always 
strong-form efficient.11 Specifically, investors and potential bidders learn the correct 
value of the corporation—that is, the present value of the free cash flow generated by the 
firm’s current assets and the reinvestment returns generated by those future free cash 
flows.  
 
 In carefully discussing the informational issues at stake, we note an important 
corollary assumption; namely that the market and potential bidders also know the value 
of the private benefits received by the managers.  The existence of private benefits makes 
the firm attractive as a takeover candidate since those benefits can be captured by the 
bidder who succeeds in buying the firm.   
 
 The assumption that the private benefits of the managers are known to the market 
seems plausible.  Elements of those private benefits are publicly disclosed when the 
highest-level executives reveal their compensation, both the fixed salary and the incentive 
components, in Securities and Exchange Act filings.12  In addition, corporate decisions 
that constitute interested transactions can be challenged by shareholders and can become 
publicly known through the mechanism of a shareholder informational suit followed by a 
shareholder derivative suit.  Since the information about private benefits is disclosed, it is 
incorporated into market prices even with semi-strong efficiency.  Strong-form efficiency 
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goes further and includes in market prices the value of private benefits that are not 
disclosed.  In strong-form efficiency, all of the private benefits—whether publicly 
disclosed or not disclosed but otherwise discovered by investors—become priced into the 
value of the firm’s shares.  
 
 The important distinction that we make is the following. On the one hand, the 
market accurately values all of the investments actually made by the firm and all of the 
corporate policies implemented by management. It also prices in the private benefits 
extracted by management.  On the other hand, the market is unable to price in the value 
of those corporate policy opportunities that are considered but rejected by the managers.  
Our key assumption, then, is that while markets are strong-form efficient when pricing 
the actual value of the corporation, they do not price in the effects on corporate value that 
occur when managers forgo certain corporate policy opportunities.   It is unlikely that 
information on the value of forgone corporate policy opportunities will ever become 
known to the financial market.  While federal disclosure requirements apply effectively 
to the value of the current assets and polices, there is no requirement that the corporation 
disclose policy opportunities that the managers decide to forgo. In addition, information 
on the value of forgone corporate policy opportunities could not be easily ferreted out 
using shareholder informational rights under state law.   
 
 As we have already noted, we would be moving well beyond strong form 
efficiency to a kind of hyper-efficiency if we were to assume that the values of all 
corporate policy options were incorporated into share prices—whether those policies 
were adopted or not.  Shareholders might well be aware that the agency problem 
discussed here exists and that a corporate policy opportunity has arisen and has been 
rejected by managers who knew its true value.  But, without hyper-efficiency of the kind 
we rule out, outside investors can never know if a particular policy was rejected because 
it was not a positive NPV opportunity or because managers were acting opportunistically.   
 
A related issue is whether shareholders could anticipate the future occurrence of 
the agency problem we have identified and could estimate its future cost.  When investors 
are aware of the agency problem, it is natural to suppose that they would, to the extent 
possible, attempt to estimate the expected cost of its future impact on the firm’s value.  If 
that were indeed possible, the market would reduce the value of the firm by this amount.  
However, it is difficult to imagine that markets will, in fact, know enough about the 
probability of occurrence and the value of possible future policy opportunities to be able 
make this calculation in any way that is not effectively arbitrary.  These are among the 
many unforeseen future contingencies that impact the firm and determine its value. The 
idea that not all future contingencies can be envisioned and prepared for is the basis for 
seminal contributions of Williamson (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1986).13 
 
 Similarly, if financial markets were hyper-efficient and the informational costs 
were low, the agency problem we discuss could be resolved by contract.  That would be 
possible if shareholders eventually learn the value of all corporate opportunities, 
including those that were forgone by managers. Shareholders would then know when 
managers had acted in their own interest by failing to implement a positive NPV 
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corporate policy and, when that happened, managers could be sanctioned.  Managers, 
however, would be deterred from engaging in such behavior if they knew that it would 
ultimately be punished by shareholders.  It seems highly implausible, however, that the 
market could eventually learn the value of corporate policies that are never implemented.  
 
 It might be thought that the agency problem introduced by shareholder choice can 
be ameliorated by the use of golden parachutes and other severance payments.  These 
compensate managers when they lose their jobs in the context of a takeover.  We will 
argue that golden parachutes are ineffective devices for preventing the problem we 
describe and that they serve to enhance the value of management discretion relative to 
shareholder choice. Furthermore, even if golden parachutes were effective they would 
over-compensate managers for the problem we identify because they make a payout 
whenever the managers lose their job in a merger. They are not conditioned on the 
specific problem—managers rejecting corporate policy opportunities that are profitable 
because it threatens their job tenure.  Since the golden parachutes are not so conditioned 
and make payouts too often, they are an inefficient mechanism for controlling for the 
agency cost problem.  We return to this issue below in the context of our formal model. 
 
 At the end of the day, managers remain imperfectly monitored and strong-form 
efficiency, as that term is generally understood, does not resolve the problems created by 
the need to give managers the ability to choose among the corporate policy opportunities 
available to the firm.  Ultimately there is no clear resolution of the classic dilemma. The 
choice between management discretion and shareholder choice involves difficult 
tradeoffs. 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1  Introductory Comments 
 
 For the purpose of the current discussion, we follow our earlier paper and identify 
a firm's corporate policy with the investment decisions that accompany the 
implementation of that policy.14  In particular, we consider a situation in which the 
managers have an opportunity to implement a significant new corporate policy by making 
a substantial investment.  Nothing turns on the corporate policy being identified with a 
substantial corporate investment, but we think it useful as an expositional device.  In the 
context of our model, the corporate policy opportunity is a one-time event. Thus, if the 
investment is not made and the policy is not implemented, the opportunity will disappear.    
 
 We assume that since this is a new opportunity that is only being considered for 
adoption, the managers are more fully informed about the potential returns associated 
with it than are outside investors.  Investors are not fully informed, but make Bayesian 
predictions as to the value of the firm’s new investment opportunities.  In making the 
model more supportive of the shareholder choice legal regime, we assume that investors 
are aware of the private benefits taken by the managers.   
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 In our model, executive compensation has two components: first, a fixed 
component, b, that is independent of the share price and second, a variable component 
that is determined by the managers’ percentage interest, s, in the residual value of the 
firm.  The various types of benefits actually received by managers can be interpreted as 
being part of either b or s depending on whether they vary with the value of the firm.  
Fixed compensation and “perks” unrelated to the value of the firm are in b.  Stock 
ownership or options awarded to the managers determine s.    
 
 Once the compensation structure is fixed, we can identify the private benefits 
entirely with the b component.15 Strictly speaking, the managers’ compensation includes 
their opportunity wage.  However, it is useful to envision the opportunity wage 
component as a subtraction from the cash flows of the existing assets and of the new 
investment.  With the managers’ opportunity cost incorporated into the free cash flows, 
the b and s components are thus interpretable as quasi-rents.  The difference between b 
and s is that the managers’ and investors’ interests are partially aligned with respect to s, 
but not with b.  The alignment of interest with respect to s follows from the fact that the s 
component provides managers with a pro rata share of the firm’s value.  On the other 
hand, the b component is deducted off from the value of the firm and is paid to or taken 
by the managers.   
 
 In setting corporate policies, the interests of shareholders and managers are 
aligned when policy decisions only affect the value of the corporation and not the 
managers’ private benefits.  Many policy decisions only affect the value of the firm and 
agency cost problems do not arise with respect to these policies.  The misalignment of 
interest is in sharpest relief in the case of hostile takeovers.  Managers will be reluctant to 
adopt corporate policies that are in the best interest of the corporation if doing so reduces 
their expected private benefits through a reduction in their expected job tenure. 
 
We start from an equilibrium position in which all firms are correctly valued and 
there is no outstanding private information.  In equilibrium we thus have strong-form 
efficiency and the market and managers agree about the present value of the firm’s cash 
flows and the value of its growth opportunities.   In this equilibrium there are no existing 
takeover opportunities.  The market knows the array of agency costs in each firm and 
these are also priced into the value of the corporation.  Consequently, whatever hostile 
tender offers are profitable at the current array of market prices, available technologies, 
economic outlook, etc. have occurred.  Of course, a bid will be profitable only if the 
bidder can cover the cost of bidding.  The fact that no bids are profitable in the initial 
equilibrium implies that b cannot exceed this cost.  In fact, we assume that managers 
know the cost of a bid and choose b to equal it so as to avoid becoming a target while 
extracting the maximum possible private benefit.   
 
We recognize that there is an immense variety of events that can disturb this 
initial equilibrium.  We suppose that the investors and management also recognize that 
the initial equilibrium will be disturbed. But we suppose that it is impossible for either 
investors or managers to anticipate with any degree of useful precision the nature of the 
possible innovations. For our purposes, we focus the discussion on cases where the 
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equilibrium is disturbed by an unanticipated one-time innovation that brings a new 
corporate policy or investment opportunity to the firm.  Because this new innovation is 
unanticipated, its expected value is not included in the present value of the firm’s existing 
growth opportunities. As discussed later, the fact that the innovation is unanticipated is 
also important for the interpretation of the results derived from the model.  
 
Once this innovation occurs, investors and managers know that it has occurred but 
managers know more than the financial market about the returns to this investment 
opportunity.  The policy is implemented if the managers, using their superior 
information, decide to make the investment.  Although the investors don’t know as much 
as the managers, they do know that the managers are better informed. The managers’ 
policy decision provides investors with a potential signal of the managers’ information.  
Investors are Bayesian and use this signal to update their beliefs about the potential 
returns to the investment opportunity.  The signal may, of course, be uninformative.  In 
our model, hostile tender offers occur at this point.  
 
In the model, a takeover occurs if the potential bidder is able to obtain a higher 
return from the new investment than current management. The case of primary interest is 
when this is possible because of the existence of synergies between the new investment 
and the assets already controlled by the potential bidder.  The possibility that a bid will 
arise because of these synergies implies that, when the managers implement the new 
policy by making the investment, they face the risk of losing control of the firm and 
losing the private benefits made possible by that control. This is a risk only in a 
shareholder choice regime.  It is the desire to avoid this risk that can lead the managers to 
fail to implement the policy even when they know that the returns to its implementation 
justify the investment.  In a management discretion regime, managers make the 
investment because they know that a hostile bid can be defeated. In this case, defeat of 
the bid is not in the shareholders’ interest. However, if managers could not defeat such 
bids they would not be willing to implement the new corporate policy when they should. 
Thus, it is in the interest of shareholders to bear the cost imposed on them by the 
managers when they choose to reject hostile bids.  
 
We assume that the price offered by the bidder equals his true valuation of the 
firm net of bidding costs. Again this is an assumption that can be relaxed at the cost of 
some complication in the arguments but without affecting the conclusions.  
 
Having briefly described the agency problem that can emerge in a shareholder 
choice regime, we want to comment on the impact it might have on the initial equilibrium 
in which we suppose the firm begins.  As we noted earlier, in the initial equilibrium, 
investors and managers are aware that new corporate policy opportunities can arise. In 
addition, they can also be aware that the agency problem we describe can occur when 
unanticipated new opportunities emerge. The fact that these opportunities cannot be 
anticipated by investors implies that the distribution of outcomes and the possible costs of 
the agency problem with any useful degree of precision. As a consequence, the initial 
equilibrium is unaffected by the existence of the agency problem. In particular, there are 
no attempts by outside investors to bid for the firm with the aim of taking it private so as 
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to avoid the agency problem. There is, hence, no need for managers to reduce private 
benefits further to eliminate the possibility of such bids. 
 
2.2 Formal description of the model 
 
In the formal description of the model it is convenient to identify the 
implementation of the new corporate policy with the decision to invest. It is also 
convenient to refer to the decision to invest as the decision to exercise an investment 
option.  
  
If the investment is made, the firm is worth 
 
 ( ) ,bIxCcfxV −−++=   
where 
 
cf = the PV of the future cash flows of the firm’s previous investments, which 
includes reinvestment in future growth opportunities at some ROE that is known 
to the market,  
C = the firms’ cash on hand, 
I  = the cost of exercising the firm’s investment option, 
=b  the private benefits extracted by the manager, 
=x  the PV of the cash flows of the investment and is the realization of a random 
variable .~x  
 
 Written in the general form we use, x is open to a number of different 
interpretations.  Recall that the Gordon growth model yields the expression 
 
 
gr
CFx
−
=   
 
where CF  is the first period cash flow, g is the growth rate of the cash flows and r is the 
discount rate.  Thus, the uncertainty about x  can arise because of uncertainty about the 
first period cash flow, the growth rate or the discount factor. 
 
We assume that, at the time the investment decision is made, x is known to the firm’s 
managers, but not to the market and that the market simply knows .~xEx =  
 
 The value of the firm is thus the sum of two parts.  The first component is 
composed of the existing assets and the reinvestments of the cash flows generated by the 
existing assets.  This component includes the present value of the future growth 
opportunities based on the existing corporate policy.   We assume that these growth 
opportunities are known to investors and are thus entirely priced into the firm’s market 
value.  The existing corporate policy thus has a known growth rate (g) and discount rate 
(r) unique to the existing corporate policy.   
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 If no new corporate policy option is open to the firm or if such an opportunity is 
available but is forgone by the managers, the firm is worth 
  
.bCcfVn −+=  
 
In that case, the managers and the market are in agreement that the value of the firm is Vn.  
In other words there is strong-form efficiency in that the share price of the common stock 
will be the value that generates an enterprise value equal to Vn. 
  
 The second component is composed of the newly available corporate policy 
opportunity.   This policy option has its own expected growth rate and discount rate, 
which is captured by the term x , and by the cost I .  As noted earlier, the possible 
emergence of this particular new “growth opportunity” is unanticipated and, therefore, 
not included in the calculation of the present value, cf .  
 
We focus on the case in which 
 
 0>− Ix  
and 
 
 .0<− Ix  
 
In this case, the managers know the corporate policy should be implemented because the 
investment has a positive net present value ( )0>NPV , while the market has the opposite 
view, believing the investment is net present value negative.  When referring to the 
investment as an option, we describe the case in which the net present value is positive as 
the case in which the investment option is in the money.  The negative net present value 
case is, thus, the case of an investment option that is out of the money. 
 
 Immediately after the investment is made, there will be a brief period in which 
strong-form efficiency fails in that the managers will know the firm is worth ( )xV , while 
the market will believe the firm is worth ( )xV . We suppose that soon after the investment 
is made, the market will quickly learn what the manager knows and will also value the 
firm at ( )xV . At that point, strong-form efficiency is restored. 
 
 Importantly we also assume that if the investment opportunity is not taken, the 
market does not come to realize its value or whether it was positive NPV.   In other 
words, strong-form efficiency is satisfied in the traditional sense. That is, the firm is 
correctly valued on its existing corporate policy and the current and future assets of that 
policy. In spite of this, the true value of the corporate policy option that has become 
available but rejected is not and never will be incorporated into that value.   
 
 We assume that outside investors realize that the agency problem exists and that 
because of it the managers may not implement new corporate policies that should be 
implemented. They never actually know, however, whether a specific corporate policy 
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opportunity was rejected because of the agency problem or because it was an opportunity 
not worth taking.  If outside investors could anticipate the arrival of new corporate policy 
opportunities, and could also accurately assess the probability of their arrival and of their 
being positive NPV investments, they would be willing to pay less for the firm. In 
particular, the firm’s value would be reduced by the expected present value of the future 
positive NPV opportunities that the market expects the firms’ managers to reject because 
of the agency problem.  As noted above, we follow Grossman and Hart, in assuming 
there are many future contingencies that cannot be foreseen by the market.  In particular 
we assume that it is impossible for market participants to assess the probability of the 
arrival of new corporate policy opportunities or even to envision the possible corporate 
policy opportunities that might arise. 
 
 Thus, outside investors know that an investment opportunity has become 
available and not been taken.  They don’t know whether it was in the money.   Not 
knowing this and not knowing the likelihood of this situation arising again, it is 
impossible for them to calculate how much the firm should be discounted because of the 
possible reoccurrence of this event. 
 
Due to the presence of agency costs, managers are assumed to make the decision 
that maximizes their compensation.  However, since managers own a share of the firm, 
their interests are partially aligned with those of the shareholders. We let 
 
s = the fractional share of the firm owned by the manager. 
 
The managers’ interests are not completely aligned with those of shareholders because, as 
managers, they also extract private benefits that reduce the value of the firm.  We 
designate the private benefits that do not vary directly and proportionally with the value 
of the firm by the termb .    
 
The managers’ total compensation is, therefore, 
 
 sVb +  
 
Allowing for the fact that private benefits are likely to differ depending on 
whether the legal regime is one of shareholder choice or management discretion, b can 
equal either sb  or mb , where 
 
 =sb  the private benefits extracted by the manager under shareholder choice 
and  
 =mb  the private benefits extracted by the manager under managerial discretion,  
 
 A conclusion of the debate over shareholder choice versus management discretion 
is that the private benefits associated with managerial discretion are larger than the 
benefits the managers are able to extract in a shareholder choice regime.  That is, we 
assume that 
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 .sm bb >  
 
The rationale is that managers set sb below the cost that a hostile bidder would have to 
pay in transaction costs to takeover the firm.  If managers extract benefits in excess of 
those costs, the resulting reduction of the firm’s value will attract hostile bidders and the 
managers will lose control of the firm and the corresponding private benefits. Thus we 
can interpret sb  as the expected cost of a takeover bid. This means that whenever a bidder 
values the firm at an amount that exceeds its market value by more than sb , a bid will 
occur.    
  
 What sets the value of mb ?   In a world where managers can just say no to tender 
offers, but still owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, mb would be determined by what 
private benefits managers could realize without running afoul of their fiduciary duties.   
 
 In section 4, we introduce a third legal regime, where managers can say no to 
tender offers, but must allow a full and free proxy contest with the bidders.  In this case, 
the private benefits of the managers would be determined as in the shareholder choice 
regime but would be higher reflecting the greater costs to the bidder of conducting a 
combined tender offer/proxy contest battle for control.    We define 
 
 pb = the private benefits extracted by managers under the mixed rule where 
bidders could succeed in winning control by combining a tender offer with a proxy 
contest.   
 
We assume.   
 
 .spm bbb >>  
  
3.  The Synergies Model 
 
This section presents a very simplified exposition of the agency problem.  We 
therefore use a highly stylized model to illustrate how the problem can arise.  It is to be 
expected that when the agency problem actually occurs the setting will be more complex, 
but the essential features that give rise to the problem will be as described in our simple 
model.  We assume that the corporate policy generates one of two possible outcomes, one 
yielding a high x and a positive NPV and the other resulting in a low x and thus a 
negative NPV.  Specifically, 
 
 { }HL xxx ,∈  
where 
 
 HL xx <  
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and where 
 
.0 IxIx HL −<<−  
 
In this model, we assume that when the firm adopts a new corporate policy it may 
increase its attractiveness to a potential bidder.   This may happen because the new policy 
creates a new array of potential synergies and these synergies are recognized by potential 
bidders.  It may happen simply because the potential bidders are better able to realize 
profits from the investment required to implement the new corporate policy. For 
simplicity, we discuss this case, using the synergies interpretation. For the same reason, 
we assume that the value of the synergies created for the bidder by the investment are the 
realization of a random variable ,~σ  where 
 
{ }Hσσ ,0~∈  
 
 ,0>Hσ  
 
and  
 ( ) .0~~Pr >=== ϕσσ HH xx  
 
The term 0>ϕ represents the probability that positive synergies are created for a 
potential bidder by the managers’ new corporate policy.  
 
As noted we are going to consider the situation in which the managers know that  
 
 0>− Ix  
 
and the market believes that 
 
 0<− Ix  
 
In this case, Hxx = .  
 
Whether 0>ϕ generates an actual hostile bid will vary depending upon whether 
the legal regime is shareholder choice or management discretion. 
 
 
3.1  The Case of Shareholder Choice 
 
 The case of interest is where both sb andϕ  are relatively high and s is relatively 
low; that is, the managers are able to take large private benefits (because the transaction’s 
takeover costs are high), there is a good chance that there are material synergies, and 
managers don’t have claims to a significant fraction of the firm’s shares.  In the 
equilibrium that arises under these conditions, the managers forgo the new corporate 
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policy even when Hxx =  and the policy has a positive NPV . Although the 
implementation of a new corporate policy constitutes a potential signal, the fact that 
managers never invest in this equilibrium implies that the lack of a new corporate policy 
is uninformative. We have a pooling equilibrium in which there is no investment when 
Hxx =  or Lxx = . As a result the outside investors’ initial beliefs are their equilibrium 
beliefs. In describing how this equilibrium arises, it is necessary to make some 
assumption about what outside investors would believe if they did observe the 
implementation of a new corporate policy. Specifically, we assume that, if a new 
corporate policy is adopted, outside investors would infer that Hxx =  and NPV > 0.     
  
 We first describe the conditions under which the managers decide not to invest 
when they know that Hxx = , that is, the investment option is in the money.  The reason 
that the managers will not make the investment is that they would lose control of the 
firm.  Note that if the managers were to choose to invest in that case, the market would 
value the firm at  
 
 .sH bIxCcf −−++  
 
But in the event that Hσσ =~  the bidder would value the firm at  
 
 ( ) IxCcf HH −+++ σ  
 
and make a bid at that price minus the cost of a bid which is .sb  The bidder is thus 
willing to bid 
 
 ( ) sHH bIxCcf −−+++ σ . 
 
In a shareholder choice regime that bid cannot be rejected and the managers would lose 
control of the firm.  In that event, the managers’ compensation would be  
 
 ( )[ ].sHH bIxCcfs −−+++ σ  
 
That is, the managers’ compensation would only be the value of their investment in the 
firm and private benefits sb would be lost.   Note that sb is subtracted off from both 
equations: the value of the firm without a bid and the value of the bid.  In the former case 
the subtraction is made to reflect the market’s knowledge of the managers’ private 
benefits.   In the later case the subtraction is made to reflect the cost of the bid.   
 
Recall, however, that with probability ,1 ϕ−  0~ =σ and no bid occurs.  In that 
case, the managers would retain their private benefits so that their compensation would 
be 
 
 ( ).sHs bIxCcfsb −−+++  
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When the managers know that Hxx =  and invest, they do not yet know if the synergies 
actually will be generated for the bidder. Thus, the expected compensation of the 
managers when they invest is  
 
 ( ) ( )[ ].1 sHHs bIfxCcfsb −−++++− ϕσϕ  
 
This means that when Hxx =  and sb and ϕ  are both large, the expected compensation 
associated with not investing exceeds the expected compensation earned by investing.  
The exact condition is   
 
 ( )[ ]Ixsb HHs −+> ϕσϕ . 
 
Consequently, the corporate policy opportunity is forgone where the managers receive 
high private benefits (even in a shareholder choice regime), and the probability of 
synergies arising out of the potential investment are also high.   In this case, there is a 
misalignment of interest between shareholders and managers because the managers have 
not only more to lose if the firm is taken over, but also because of a greater probability of 
losing control.    
 
 In the other possible case, Lxx =  and the investment option is out of the money.  
Since managers own a fraction of the firm, they will not make investments that reduce the 
value of the firm and they choose not to implement the new corporate policy.  In this 
case, there is no misalignment of interest.16  Consequently, under the conditions we are 
considering (both sb and ϕ are large), the managers do not adopt the new corporate policy 
whether Hxx =  or Lxx = .  The fact that the investment is not made in either case means 
that we have a pooling equilibrium whereby investors cannot learn anything when 
managers do not make the investment.   
 
 In the pooling equilibrium described, the outside investors never have an 
opportunity to learn that the manager chose not to exercise an investment option that was 
in the money simply because the investment is never made.  In equilibrium, the firm is 
correctly valued at  
 
 .sbCcf −+  
 
Since the firm is correctly valued based on all private as well as public information, 
strong-form efficiency holds in equilibrium! 
 
Before leaving the case of shareholder choice it is useful to note that, when  
 
( )[ ],Ixsb HHs −+< ϕσϕ  
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the equilibrium will be one in which the managers invest when the investment option is 
in the money and don’t invest when it is not. In this equilibrium, outside investors will 
interpret the managers’ decision not to invest as a signal that they know that the option is 
out of the money and interpret the decision to invest as a signal that the option is in the 
money. This is the same equilibrium as the one that arises in the case of managerial 
discretion, the case we consider next. Under these conditions, the bid does take place and 
is successful when the synergies actually arise.  In other words, in this case the managers 
do implement the new corporate policy because the value of the policy to them as 
shareholders exceeds the possibility of lost private benefits.  Alignment of interest occurs, 
but possibly because of the high stock options granted to managers in order to increase 
their personal gains from any merger. 
  
3.2  The Case of Management Discretion 
 
Management discretion means that the managers can decide to maintain takeover 
defenses that prevent shareholders from tendering into the bidder’s offer.   Since they are 
no longer concerned about losing control of the firm to a hostile tender offer, the 
manager’s interests are aligned with the shareholders when choosing the firm’s corporate 
policy.  Now, the equilibrium is one in which the managers invest when the investment 
option is in the money and don’t invest when it is out of the money. The outside investors 
believe that the investment option is out of the money when they observe the managers 
choose not to invest and they believe the option is in the money when the managers are 
observed to invest.  
 
When the option is in the money, and the managers invest, they face no risk of a 
bid and, as a consequence, their compensation is   
 
( ) ( )IxCcfsbs Hm −+++−1  
 
If they choose not to invest, their compensation is  
 
( ) ( )Ccfsbs m ++−1 . 
Since 
 
,0>− IxH  
 
the managers prefer to invest. 
 
When the option is out of the money, and the managers invest, they face no risk of 
a bid and, as a consequence, their compensation is   
 
( ) ( )IxCcfsbs Lm −+++−1 . 
 
If they choose not to invest, their compensation is  
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( ) ( )Ccfsbs m ++−1 . 
 
Since, in this case, 
 
,0<− IxL  
 
the managers prefer not to invest.   
 
 Consequently, when managers can defeat uninvited tender offers, they will adopt 
whatever corporate policies maximize the value of the firm.  This is the major benefit of a 
management discretion regime.  It occurs because managers own some value of the s  and 
making the correct value maximizing decisions poses no threat to their private benefits 
mb  
 
3.3  The Legal Systems Compared 
 
 In the case where synergies are present and the corporate policy opportunity is in 
the money, the shareholder choice and management discretion regimes generate different 
outcomes for shareholders if the private benefits of control are significant and the risk of 
a new corporate policy generating a hostile bid is high.  Under a shareholder choice 
regime, the managers choose to avoid the risk of losing their private benefits as the result 
of a successful hostile bid by choosing not to implement the new policy even though they 
know they are making a choice that is not in the interests of shareholders. In this case, the 
shareholders’ interest in the corporation is always the value of the corporation under the 
existing or prior corporate policy, minus the private benefits taken by the managers 
 
 sbCcf −+ . 
 
Under managerial discretion the corporate policy opportunity is always adopted when it 
is in the money, but the hostile tender offer is rejected if it occurs.  Hence, the 
shareholders get  
 
 ( ) mHH bIxCcf −−++ µ , 
 
where Hµ  is the probability of  Hxx =~ . The shareholders are clearly better off under 
management discretion if  
 
 ( ) smHH bbIx −>−µ , 
 
where the left side of the above inequality is the expected value of the investment option 
if it is exercised when it is in the money. This condition means that shareholders are 
better off under management discretion if the expected benefits from the new corporate 
policy, ignoring the possible forsaken gains from a potential takeover, exceed the 
additional agency costs of managerial discretion.   
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It should be noted that in both legal regimes the shareholders lose the expected 
value of the synergies. Under shareholder choice this happens because the investment is 
never made even when it should be.  Hence the opportunity to make use of the synergies 
does not arise.  Under managerial discretion, the investment is made, but the synergistic 
bid is rejected.   If these bids were not rejected, the firm would be worth   
 
[ ]( ) mHHH bIxCcf −−+++ ϕσµ  
 
to the shareholders. Thus, the total cost of the new agency problem we have identified as 
arising in a shareholder choice regime is 
 
 [ ]( )Ix HHH −+ϕσµ , 
 
the expected value of the investment option. By switching to a managerial discretion 
regime, only part of this agency cost is avoided; namely 
 
  ( )IxHH −µ . 
 
What is lost in both regimes is  
 
 HHϕσµ , 
 
the expected value of the synergies. 
 
 In the comparison of the legal regimes that emerges from the model as described 
above, the cost borne by shareholders in a managerial choice regime is the increase in the 
agency costs  
 
 sm bb − . 
 
 This term omits a cost of managerial discretion that needs to be discussed to 
complete our analysis.  This cost arises because there of the possibility that a bidder will 
emerge who is able to put the firm’s current assets to better use, perhaps because of 
synergies, than the current management.  As distinct from our earlier discussion, which 
involves an innovation directly affecting the managers’ corporate policy options, this is 
an innovation directly affecting the bidder’s options as they relate to the existing assets of 
the managers.  Under a shareholder choice regime, bids made by these bidders will be 
successful and the current assets will as a consequence be moved to their best use. Under 
a management discretion regime such bids will be defeated. As a result shareholders will 
suffer and total welfare is reduced because the firm’s existing assets will not be used 
efficiently.  If we let ρ be the expected increase in the value of the firm’s existing assets 
when bidders emerge who can put them to better use, then the total loss to shareholders 
under a managerial discretion regime is  
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 ρ+− sm bb , 
 
and it is this that must be compared to the cost, 
 
 ( )IxHH −µ , 
 
incurred under a shareholder choice regime.   The revised condition under which 
management discretion is preferred by shareholders is 
 
 ( ) ρµ +−>− smHH bbIx  
 
As noted, the loss of ρ is an inefficiency that reduces social welfare. The same is true of  
 
 ( )IxHH −µ . 
 
In contrast,  
 
 sm bb − . 
 
is a loss to shareholders but a gain to managers and, as such, it does not represent an 
inefficiency.  
 
3.4 Going Private as a Solution to the Agency Problem 
 
Since privately held firms avoid the management-shareholder conflict, they are 
not afflicted with agency problems. It would seem, therefore, that “going private” 
transactions—in an anticipation of the existence of the agency problem—could provide a 
solution to the particular agency problem that we have identified as arising in a 
shareholder choice regime. As we now argue, however, under the assumptions we have 
made, there are limits to the extent to which the going private transaction can eliminate 
the costs of this agency problem. In particular, we have assumed that the potential 
investment opportunities whose emergence gives rise to the agency problem are 
“unanticipated one-time opportunities”. Let’s first discuss how taking the firm private 
could either avoid or reduce the cost of the agency problem if these assumptions were not 
satisfied.  
 
Suppose first that outside investors could, in advance, accurately assess the 
agency problem’s expected future cost. They would then be willing to pay a premium for 
the firm with the aim of taking it private and avoiding the problem’s future occurrence. 
But bids to take the firm private could be made unprofitable in the initial equilibrium if 
the managers reduced the private benefits they extracted to the point at which the cost of 
those benefits equaled the cost of a bid minus the expected future agency cost. The effect 
of this reduction in the private benefits extracted by managers is a reduction in the 
traditional agency cost borne in a shareholder choice regime. It does not eliminate the 
agency problem we have identified but it does reduce the total agency cost of a 
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shareholder choice regime. If, however, the expected future agency costs were very high, 
the managers might be unable to make private equity bids unprofitable in the initial 
equilibrium even by extracting no private benefits at all. In such cases, the agency 
problem would, indeed, be eliminated by bidders who could profit by taking the firm 
private.  
 
Specifically, suppose that, in a shareholder choice regime, outside investors did 
anticipate the emergence of the potential new investment opportunity and could 
accurately assess the probabilities we have discussed as well as the probability of the 
emergence of the investment option, which we denote byψ . In that case, a bidder who 
intended to take the firm private could make an expected profit, taking into account the 
cost of the bid, by buying the firm, making the investment if the opportunity to do so 
arose and if it was a positive NPV investment. He could then sell the firm if the synergy 
value of the new assets for another bidder were positive. The expected cost of the agency 
problem avoided by taking the firm private is  
 
 ( )IxHH −+ϕσψµ , 
 
and this minus of the cost of a bid is also the profit to the bidder who takes the firm 
private.  Even when outside investors accurately assess the probabilities of the investment 
opportunity arising, being a positive NPV investment and creating synergies for another 
bidder, the managers of the firm can prevent a bid by reducing the private benefits by the 
amount   
 
 ( )IxHH −+ϕσψµ . 
  
When 
 
 ( )IxHH −+ϕσψµ  
 
exceeds the cost of a bid the managers cannot prevent the firm from being taken private 
in the initial equilibrium even if they reduce the private benefits they extract to zero. In 
that case, the firm will be taken private and the agency problem will fail to arise.  
 
Note, however, that when, as we have assumed, the emergence of the new policy 
opportunity is “unanticipated” and investors are unable to accurately assess the expected 
agency cost,  
 
( )IxHH −+ϕσψµ , 
 
in advance, it will be impossible for private equity bidders to know what price to pay for 
the firm. In such a situation, taking the firm private becomes ineffective as a device for 
eliminating or reducing the impact of the agency problem. Also, as we noted earlier, the 
outside investors’ inability to accurately assess the expected cost of the agency problem 
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arising under shareholder choice implied that the potential for the problem to arise had no 
impact on the initial equilibrium.   
 
 The assumption that the investment opportunity is a one time opportunity that is 
lost if it the investment is not made is also important. If it were possible to revisit the 
decision to make the investment at a later time, a bidder who had observed the manager’s 
decision not to invest could take the firm private, learn what managers know about the 
investment and make the investment if it were a positive NPV opportunity. In that way 
they could realize the expected gains  
 
 ( )IxHH −+ϕσµ . 
 
3.5 Golden Parachutes as a Solution to the Agency Problem 
 
 The agency problem we have discussed arises because managers seek to avoid 
hostile bids that result in the loss of the private benefits the managers extract from the 
firm.  Consequently, it might seem that the adoption of a golden parachute could resolve 
the entrenchment problem by compensating managers for the loss of their private benefits 
should their firm be taken over.   In fact, in the context of our model, the introduction of 
golden parachutes actually makes shareholders worse off by raising the cost of a bid and 
thus worsens rather than resolves the agency cost problem.  This means that the 
introduction of golden parachutes has only negative consequences; there are no positive 
benefits. As a consequence, the introduction of golden parachutes raises the appeal of a 
management discretion regime relative to shareholder choice.   
 
 The problem is that when bidders are forced to pay for a golden parachute, the 
cost of a bid rises by the cost of the parachute and this makes it possible for managers to 
extract even higher private benefits without attracting a bid.  In fact, the managers can 
increase the private benefits they extract by exactly the amount of the parachute’s cost. 
Thus, when a parachute is introduced the benefits lost are inflated by exactly the value of 
the parachute they receive.  When there is a parachute and the managers compare the 
private benefits they might lose in a takeover to the compensation they could receive in a 
takeover, the  private benefits they anticipate losing are inflated by the parachute’s value 
and the inflation in these benefits exactly cancels the value of the parachute received 
when the takeover occurs.     
 
Formally, shareholder choice creates an agency problem because managers expect 
to lose private benefits, sb , when a hostile bid succeeds.  As presented our argument 
assumes the absence of any “golden parachutes,” that promise managers compensation in 
the event of a change in control.   If the firm does have a golden parachute in place, the 
cost of a bid will include its cost, call it p . If sb  are the private benefits extracted when 
there is no golden parachute, then the private benefits extracted when the cost of a bid 
includes p  will rise to pbs + .  This means that the managers are able to capture the 
value of the parachute in the form of additional private benefits even if no bid occurs.  It 
also means that the private benefits lost if a bid occurs are larger by exactly the amount of 
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the parachute paid when a takeover occurs. When there is a parachute, the condition 
under which the agency problem arises under shareholder choice is 
 
 ( )[ ] pIxspb HHs ϕϕσϕ +−+>+ )( , 
 
but this is the same condition under which the agency problem arose without a parachute. 
This means that under shareholder choice and with a parachute, the managers will 
misbehave in exactly the same situations as they would if there were no parachute. 
 
The introduction of the parachute also has no impact on the situations in which a 
bid occurs.  Without a parachute a bid occurs when, net of the bidding cost, the bidder’s 
value of the firm exceeds the firm’s market value which includes a discount for the 
private benefits extracted. Since the financial market deducts agency costs from the value 
of the firm, the market value of the company falls by p .  But this fall in the cost of the 
shares is exactly matched by the rise in the cost of a bid.  Since the cost of the bid is 
subtracted from the bidder’s valuation of the firm, net value of the firm to the bidder is 
unchanged.  Hence there will be neither fewer nor more bids.   
 
 Those who prefer shareholder choice over management discretion do so because 
of the fact that managers are able to extract smaller private benefits when faced with the 
threat of takeovers that cannot be resisted under shareholder choice. Indeed, in our model 
the private benefits managers can extract in a shareholder choice regime are restricted to 
equal the cost of a bid.  In this setting the advantage of a shareholder choice regime is 
diminished when the cost of a bid, and the private benefits extracted by managers, are 
inflated by the introduction of a golden parachute. Formally if we continue to interpret sb  
as the cost of a bid excluding the value of the golden parachute, then a golden parachute 
worth p  to the managers raises the cost of a takeover and hence the private benefits 
extracted by managers from sb  to pbs + .  This increase in the private benefits managers 
extract are an added cost to shareholders under shareholder choice.   
 
 The apparent motivation for a golden parachute is lacking in a management 
discretion regime. But if a golden parachute is introduced into such a regime it should 
have no impact on the private benefits extracted. In that case, the private benefits are mb  
and independent of the cost of a bid. Thus, the increase in the cost of a bid caused by the 
introduction of a golden parachute has no effect and managers continue to extract  mb  .  
Hence the introduction of a golden parachute in each regime reduces the extra private 
benefits extracted in a management discretion regime from  
 
 sm bb −  
to 
 pbb sm −− . 
 
This, of course, means that the introduction of a golden parachute diminishes the 
relative attractiveness of the shareholder choice regime while, as we have already noted, 
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yielding no benefits in terms of eliminating the agency problem we have identified as 
arising in a shareholder choice regime. 
 
4.  When the Alternative to Shareholder Choice is the Proxy Vote Rule 
 
 In this section, we analyze more rigorously what is meant by the terms 
“shareholder choice” and “management discretion” and discuss whether the conclusions 
we reach with respect to management discretion hold once one recognizes that hostile 
tender offers that are held-up, on account of a poison-pill, can eventually succeed once 
the bidder wages and wins one or two (in the case of a staggered board) proxy contests.   
 
 In their current version, neither the shareholder choice nor the management 
discretion is a pure form.  For example, a pure shareholder choice regime would be the 
rule first favored by Easterbrook and Fischel (1981) when they argued for complete 
management passivity in the face of a takeover.  This argument is consistent with strong-
form efficiency.  Since the market price always incorporates all information both public 
and private, any hostile tender offer has to move resources to their more valued use.  
Poison pills or other defensive strategies would primarily have the effect of raising the 
cost of a bid.  In our model as we have so far developed it, the ability to deploy poison 
pills has the effect of raising the private benefits that managers can extract from 
sb to mb .
17   
 
 Instead, shareholder choice has come to be recognized as a rule that incorporates 
the Chancery Court’s Interco doctrine. Under Interco a target firm could indeed maintain 
a poison pill long enough to negotiate a better price or advance a superior option.  But 
after an interval long enough to give managers a chance to proffer alternatives, the poison 
pill would have to be lifted.   
 
 The best case for an Interco rule over a complete passivity rule is that by 
providing managers with a bargaining tool it creates a disclosure-rich environment.  In 
doing this, the Interco doctrine helped move financial markets from being semi-strong to 
being strong-form efficient.  That is, after a bid is made shareholders learn (more of) 
what managers knew but have not previously revealed.  
 
 Pure management discretion can be identified with an interpretation of Time-
Warner that allows managers to “just say no” to a tender offer.  The problem with this 
interpretation is twofold: first the Delaware courts have never adopted even an implicit 
“just say no” rule and second, since shareholders ultimately get to choose the directors, 
the shareholders do get to eventually decide the fate of the managers.  Instead, 
management discretion has come to be recognized as a rule that builds layers of defensive 
strategies to a point where a would-be bidder would be effectively deterred.   
 
 How do these more mixed regimes operate in the context of our model?18  In fact, 
a regime that facilitates a proxy contest for control will, in some cases, operate in a 
manner similar to shareholder choice, but with higher costs.  That is, under some 
conditions, a so-called management discretion regime degenerates into a very costly 
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shareholder choice regime.  However, under certain very plausible assumptions, we can 
generate the same results as those obtained in a management discretion regime even 
when there is a need for annual elections.  
 
 The factor that is most important in determining which case obtains is the 
expected cost of acquiring a firm by means of a proxy contest and how that cost relates to 
the private benefits extracted by management and to the value of the synergies a new 
investment project might generate for a potential bidder.   We let γ  equal the costs of a 
takeover that requires a proxy contest.  It is natural to assume thatγ  is significantly 
higher than the costs of a successful hostile tender offer in a shareholder choice regime.  
This means that sb>γ  where, it will be recalled sb is the value of the private benefits 
extracted by managers in a shareholder choice regime and is chosen by managers to equal 
the cost of a takeover in that regime. It will also be recalled that, in a management 
discretion regime, managers are able extract larger private benefits than is possible under 
shareholder choice. We have labeled these benefits mb  and they are the maximum private 
benefits that managers can extract from the firm given the constraints imposed by the 
managers’ fiduciary duties. Thus sm bb > . Now γ  may or may not rise to the level of mb . 
Whenγ  is below mb , the private benefits managers are able to extract, which we call pb , 
will be limited to γ  for reasons that are the same as those discussed in the case of 
shareholder choice.  In this case, the agency problem is not eliminated when a 
shareholder choice regime is replaced by one that introduces a proxy contest requirement. 
Indeed, the only effect of the introduction of a proxy contest requirement is to raise the 
agency cost from sb  to γ=pb . To demonstrate that this is so we simply replace sb  with 
γ=pb and use the same argument as that used above for the case of shareholder choice.  
 
 The same conclusion holds and the argument leading to this conclusion is again 
essentially the same as that used in the case of shareholder choice when mb>γ  as long as 
γ  is only slightly above mb .  When γ exceeds mb , managers are unable to raise their 
private benefits to the level ofγ . In this case, their private benefits will be limited 
to mp bb = .  Recall that the agency problem can arise as long as the investment under 
consideration creates the possibility that bidders can obtain synergistic gains by acquiring 
the new assets. When γ exceeds mb , the agency problem will arise if such bids actually 
present a threat to management.  That will happen in this case, if the value of the 
potential synergies, Hσ , plus the private benefits mb  exceed the cost γ  of obtaining the 
firm via a proxy contest; formally, if Hmb σγ +< .  When this condition holds, the bidder 
can pay a premium for the firm that enables him to profit from a bid. Managers know that 
a corporate policy opportunity that raises the likelihood of there being synergistic benefits 
will lead to a bid.  Under the new regime, the managers can thwart the bid at the tender 
offer stage, but the bidder will continue to the proxy contest and win control.  The threat 
of this possibility deters the managers from making the investment and there is still an 
agency problem.  The impact of the new legal rule is thus limited to raising the costs of a 
takeover, while otherwise losing the benefits of management discretion.  
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In the cases discussed above, the agency problem is more likely to occur because 
of the increase in the private benefits the managers are able to extract. As we have noted, 
the managers will extract  
 
 smp bbb >= },min{ γ . 
 
The agency problem will occur in the proxy contest regime when  
 
 ( )[ ]Ixsb HHp −+> ϕσϕ  
 
The agency problem occurs under shareholder choice when  
 
 ( )[ ]Ixsb HHs −+> ϕσϕ . 
 
Because sp bb > , the agency problem occurs in the proxy regime whenever it occurs in 
the shareholder choice regime.  There will be some cases in which 
 
 ( )[ ] sHHp bIxsb ϕϕσϕ >−+>  
 
and, in those cases, the agency problem arises in a proxy contest regime but not in a 
shareholder choice regime.   
 
 When the value of the potential synergies, Hσ , plus the private benefits mb  
exceed the cost γ  of obtaining the firm by means of a proxy contest; i.e., when 
mH b+> σγ , the high cost of acquiring the firm in this regime makes it impossible for 
the potential bidder to make a bid for the firm that exceeds its market value. This 
eliminates the threat of a bid.  In this case, the managers can effectively say no to a bid 
and be assured that when they do, a proxy contest will not ensue.  Since we assume 
efficient markets throughout the argument, the managers know this fact just as the bidder 
knows the value to it of the new investment made by the managers.  Consequently, the 
managers can make the investment knowing that the costs of bidding will protect them 
from an uninvited tender offer.  The managers will thus maximize their wealth, as in the 
above model, by maximizing the value of the firm without fear of a takeover.  The 
outcome is thus the same as in management discretion.   
 
 As we have modeled this regime, it will, in some cases, operate as a management 
discretion regime. In other cases, it will result in outcomes that are similar to, but worse 
than, shareholder choice. The outcome produced in a particular case will depend on the 
value of the possible synergies.  When synergies are likely to be large, the additional 
costs of the proxy contest will not be bid-discouraging and the agency costs we have 
discussed will occur.  When synergies are likely to be small relative to the cost of 
acquiring the firm by means of a proxy contest, the agency problem is eliminated and the 
outcome is the same as in management discretion. 
   
 - 26 - 
 
 Which of these outcomes is most likely?  Since our discussion is model-specific, 
we cannot draw general conclusions.  In particular, our discussion does not factor in the 
informational effect of a proxy contest versus a tender offer.  Critical to the effective 
workings of the legal regime is that when shareholders get the right to decide the 
outcome, that they be informed as possible.  The disclosure rich environment of the 
takeover battles is the bulwark of the shareholder choice model.  It is very possible that a 
proxy contest adds valuable information that makes mistakes less likely.  If this is the 
case, although a layered process of a hostile tender offer followed by a proxy contest may 
be the most efficient rule.   
 
5.   Market Efficiency and Alternative Justifications for Management Discretion 
 
 An important contribution of this paper is to deal explicitly with the interaction 
between financial market efficiency and the appropriate legal regime for governing 
takeover defenses.  Indeed, assumptions about market efficiency are closely related to the 
informational issues that we discuss in section 2, and have to be the cornerstone 
assumptions for any rigorous analysis of the efficiency of alternative legal regimes.   
Ultimately, the value of giving managers discretion to make decisions on the optimal 
corporate policy is that they are better informed than shareholders.  While it is widely 
agreed that the costs of non-delegation require that the managers conduct the day-to-day 
affairs of the company, longer-range corporate policy issues could decided by 
shareholder if managers were not better informed.  Hence, if financial markets become 
strong-form efficient in the disclosure-rich environment of a takeover battle, shareholders 
know as much about the value of the firm as do managers and shareholder choice would 
appear to be the winning argument.  
 
 In fact, the relationship between market efficiency and the appropriate legal rule 
for regulating defensive strategies in takeover battles is complex.  Among the first claims 
for management discretion was the arguments advanced by Martin Lipton and his 
associates (Lipton and Rowe, 2002). Their argument was that financial markets were 
inefficient even in the midst of a takeover battle. Consequently, companies that were 
under-priced could be taken over in a hostile bid absent a management discretion legal 
regime.  Wachter has shown that, in fact, the claim that financial markets are inefficient, 
perhaps paradoxically, does not favor management discretion at all.  The problem with 
the Lipton argument is that if the market is inefficient enough, the target’s shares may 
remain under-priced for a very long time, so the shareholders should be able to cash out 
at any bid above market price even if that price is below going concern value.  Indeed, 
going-private transactions are efficiency enhancing in such a world, since such 
transactions or the threat of such transactions brings transaction prices closer to going 
concern value.   
 
 The key part of the Wachter argument, which we build on in our earlier paper, is 
that managers may respond to the threat of takeovers by managing to the market.  This is 
an agency cost to the extent that managers are better informed than shareholders, but 
ignore their own information to do what the shareholders prefer.  The market never 
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discovers the mismanagement because it occurs under the protection of the business 
judgment rule when the managers fail to make a positive NPV investment that the market 
dislikes.19 Because the market believes that the managers have made the correct decision 
it rewards the managers with a high share price rather than penalizing the 
mismanagement. The increase in the share price protects managers from the risk of being 
taken over and it is the desire to reduce this risk by raising the share price that motivates 
managers to acquiesce to the market.  Even if the shareholders were ultimately able to 
discover that the managers knew they had made the wrong the decision, they would be 
unlikely to punish managers for making a decision that was preferred by the investors. 
 
 The agency problem described in this paper also arises when managers fail to 
make an investment that they know should be made.  Since there is no subsequent 
investment performance on which to base a judgment about the wisdom of the managers’ 
decision, the market simply never learns whether the managers destroyed value or not. 
Furthermore, the decision not to invest is made under the protection of the business 
judgment rule and investors lack the legal tools that might enable them to investigate the 
wisdom of the managers’ decision. Because there is no reason to believe that markets can 
learn that an investment not made should have been, the agency problem we describe 
cannot be solved by contracting. For the same reason markets are unable to punish 
managers who fail to make good investments because of the agency problem.  
Specifically, the absence of experience makes it impossible for markets to bid down the 
firm’s share price as a way of penalizing managers who fail to make good investments.  
 
 In our earlier work and in this paper, we recognize that the financial markets will 
ultimately learn what mangers know about investments that are made and the markets 
will be strong form efficient.  Thus, if our agency problem had resulted in inefficient 
investments, the market could penalize the managers by bidding down the price of the 
shares, not only reflecting the value destruction of the managers’ decision, but also 
reflecting the possibility that managers may make such poor choices again.  In such a 
circumstance any desired entrenchment effect would be lost, and the managers’ income 
would fall because of the decline in the value of the stock.  Shareholders who learn that 
managers have made inefficient investments can, of course, impose even more severe 
punishments by reducing the managers’ compensation or replacing them. The threat of 
these penalties works like implicit contracts and could eliminate the agency problem in 
cases where bad investments are actually being made.    
 
 A paper by Arlen and Talley (2003) presents an argument that is similar to those 
of the present paper and of our earlier papers.  The agency problem they describe is very 
similar to the one described here and in our earlier paper. It results in inefficient 
investment decisions protected by the business judgment rule and the inefficient 
decisions are motivated by management’s desire to prevent hostile bids. In contrast to the 
agency problem of the present paper the Arlen-Talley agency problem involves 
observable overinvestment in assets that can be used as part of a strategy to deter 
takeovers. In particular, managers over-invest in assets that can subsequently be sold 
contingent on the occurrence of an acquisition. These transaction-based business 
strategies are defensive measures that work very much like a poison pill.20 In the Arlen 
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and Talley model, managers have no informational advantage over outside investors who 
are aware that managers are making inefficient investments. The fact that managers have 
destroyed firm value by choosing to make the wrong investment so as to discourage a 
hostile bid becomes known to the market and reduces the firm’s value.   
 
 Although the market is aware of the value destruction, Arlen and Talley assume 
that the investment decision is “not contractible” and therefore cannot be punished.  In 
other words, the financial market knows that the managers have reduced firm value, but 
is unable to take action to prevent it or to redress it after the fact.  Since the managers 
know that they will never be held to account for their misdeeds they are free to make 
them and are thus able to effectively entrench themselves. 
 
 The idea that shareholders cannot perfectly contract with managers to enforce 
good behavior is a reasonable assumption, but the idea of perfect non-contractability 
seems implausible if that term is taken to mean that shareholders cannot punish 
observable bad behavior.  As long as the bad behavior becomes known, shareholders will 
be inclined to assume that managers who have behaved badly once will do so again. This 
should lead to a decline in the share price that makes the firm more susceptible to a 
takeover.  Such a response to observed bad behavior is likely to occur even in the case of 
dispersed shareholders who are rationally apathetic and therefore do not invest their time 
and money in forcing managers to act in the interest of shareholders.  As long as the bad 
behavior become known, managers are likely to be punished for bad behavior in the form 
of a lower stock price.   
 
 Perfect non-contractibility is even more unlikely in the case of markets that are 
strong-form efficient. When markets are efficient in this sense, investors learn soon after 
an investment has been made whether it should have been.  In such a situation, there is 
every reason for managers to expect to be punished for making bad investments.  Thus, 
when markets are strong form efficient, implicit contracts should provide managers with 
the same incentives they would face if explicit contracts were in place. When investment 
performance is observable, these implicit contracts can be implemented without any 
costly information acquisition by investors and can arise even if shareholdings are 
dispersed.  
 
 However, as institutional investors emerge, such as private equity and hedge fund 
investors, investment in learning about even nonpublic information is more likely.  Such 
institutional investors, having invested in information gathering to guide their informed 
investment decisions, are particularly unlikely to allow managerial bad decisions to go 
unpunished.  In other words, as markets become more efficient, active investors are likely 
to replace inactive ones and bad deeds are even more likely to be punished.  The key 
point is that managers cannot expect to go unpunished if they are observed to have 
destroyed shareholder value by making bad investments that enable them to adopt 
defensive techniques.   
 
 Known bad behavior is simply not part of an effective takeover defense.  The 
protection of the business judgment rule is needed, not only to protect the decision from 
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being contested—as in the Arlen and Talley paper—but also to protect the facts behind 
the decision from becoming known.  In our model, the specific problem just discussed is 
avoided because under our assumptions the financial market never learns when managers 
make bad decisions.    
 
6.   Conclusion 
 
 In closing, we return to the starting point.  Is there a conceptual framework that 
supports a rule of management discretion and is this framework consistent with the 
Delaware’s courts basic tenets?  We believe that the answer is yes with our model 
providing the basic framework.  This is surely not to claim, however, that the Delaware 
courts have any such deductive model explicitly in mind.  Nor does it claim to reconcile 
the inconsistencies apparent in the case law.  Instead, we have built on what we take to be 
Delaware’s corporate law’s two core concepts. 
 
 Delaware corporate law has two continuing themes that we have used to form our 
model.  First, corporate managers are best suited to decide on the firm’s corporate policy 
because they are better informed than the market as to the investment opportunities 
available to the firm.21   Second, the legal rule has to be one that best encourages 
managers to act as faithful fiduciaries.  The teachings of Unocal with respect to takeover 
defenses and the case law that followed it are based on just such an assumption.  The 
judges are quite aware that managers can sometimes operate to further their own interest 
rather than the interests of the corporation.  What legal rule for takeover defenses makes 
this bad play least likely to occur?22   
 
 The traditional claim is that shareholder choice provides the best incentives for 
managers to act faithfully because they are subject to the discipline of efficient capital 
markets.  We challenge that conclusion by identifying a new type of agency cost that 
occurs in a shareholder choice context but not when the legal rule is management 
discretion.  The agency cost occurs because managers can choose among corporate 
policies in a manner that is undetected by the market because it occurs behind the barriers 
of the business judgment rule.  In a management discretion regime, but not in a 
shareholder regime, the managers have the incentive to maximize the value of the firm 
even when making decisions that are protected from shareholder inspection and 
challenge. 
 
 Our model departs from Delaware case law only in assuming strong-form 
efficiency, which is clearly inconsistent with the courts’ mistrust of market prices and the 
ability of shareholders to become fully informed.23   Our purpose in assuming strong-
form efficiency is only to test whether the court’s teachings with respect to takeover 
defenses would be invalidated were such an assumption warranted.24  The answer is that 
a rule of management discretion is still consistent, even if markets are strong-form 
efficient as that term is generally understood.  Shareholders may be fully informed as to 
the value of the corporation’s assets and policy, but they will still not learn the value of 
corporate policies that managers have failed to adopt, and this provides the cover for 
faithless fiduciaries under a shareholder choice regime. 
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 This paper also provides some new intuition with respect to perhaps the oldest 
debate on the appropriate legal rule for takeover defenses.  The earliest argument for 
shareholder choice was the Easterbrook and Fischel (1981) model that the legal rule 
should require managers to be passive when faced with a hostile tender offer.  This was 
effectively countered separately by Bebchuk (1982) and Gilson (1981) who argued that 
takeover defenses were appropriate because they allowed managers to bargain for and 
secure a higher price for the shareholders of target companies.  But this justification of 
takeover defenses contains a built in puzzle if one assumes that shareholders are rational 
investors.  Rational investors are fully diversified shareholders and such investors are 
indifferent as to the premium secured by managers in a hostile tender offer.  The reason is 
that fully diversified shareholders own both the bidder and the target and thus are both 
payers and payees of the premium.  They lose on one stock what they gain on the other.  
That means that shareholders should only favor legal rules that increase the total value of 
all the companies in the financial market.  The puzzle is avoided if the takeover defenses 
employed in a management discretion regime do indeed, as we have argued here, 
increase the total value across firms by eliminating the agency problem posed by a 
shareholder choice legal regime.   
 
 Our analysis can also be used to provide an explanation to a puzzle, raised by 
Daines and Klausner (2001), with respect to the adoption of takeover defenses by many 
firms prior to their initial public offering (IPO).  They ask why shareholders put up with 
such tactics in the IPO context?  The expectation, with which we agree, is that at the IPO 
stage shareholders should have the most power and at that stage managers should be most 
likely to follow shareholders’ preferences.  If takeover defenses have a negative effect on 
the value of the firm, why is it that shareholders appear to be indifferent in pricing 
between corporations that have effective takeover defenses and those that do not?   In 
effect, the market either does not mark down the price of firms that have such provisions, 
or the markdown is one that managers are willing to absorb.  Daines and Klausner work 
through various possible explanations but do not find one that fits their data.   
 
 Our answer is simply that effective takeover defenses may be of value to 
shareholders. The prediction of our model is that the choice of effective takeover 
defenses should not obviously have a material affect on the IPO price.  At the end of the 
day, the choice between management discretion and shareholder choice is a tradeoff and 
thus any price effect of takeover defenses will also reflect this tradeoff.  If the tradeoff is 
close to a “wash,” then the expected market price should be zero.   
 
 Finally, this paper is complementary with the paper by Kahan and Rock (2003).   
They point out that the corporation’s articles of incorporation express the wishes of the 
managers and the shareholders and their choices should be respected by the courts.  
Hence, if the parties choose a staggered board, then that choice of a takeover defense 
should be respected by the courts.  But why should the courts treat deferentially the 
original choice of the parties?  If shareholders are the residual claimants who “own” the 
company and a majority of shareholders wants to overturn takeover defenses so as to 
facilitate a hostile bid, why not have the courts’ enforce the shareholders choice?  Why 
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give greater deference to some private allocation of power agreed to by the directors and 
the shareholders?  In other words, why does the board “count” since they are the elected 
representatives of the shareholders and they can be replaced by a majority vote?      
      
 Our answer here parallels our answer to the earlier question.  The shareholders 
want to be able to delegate certain decisions to the board so that the board or managers 
can rely on it when they carry out their responsibility for establishing and implementing 
the firm’s corporate policy.  If managers believe the corporation’s certificate and by-laws 
puts them in a management discretion legal regime then they can make the appropriate 
corporate policy decisions without having to factor into their calculus the probability of a 
hostile tender offer.  Should the applicable legal rule be alterable without management 
agreement, then rational managers will assume they are governed by shareholder choice 
and make their corporate policy decisions accordingly.  
 
 In summary, we conclude that the classic dilemma of corporate policy remains 
intact: although managers will act in their own interests, shareholders need to delegate to 
the managers the ability to choose the corporate policy that maximizes the value of the 
shareholder’s residual share.  Even with strong-form efficiency as their term is generally 
understood, managers can make decisions—in particular, can avoid policies that make 
hostile bids more likely—that are not discoverable because of the protection of the 
business judgment rule.  Depending upon the tradeoffs identified in our model—
shareholders may at the end of the day be better served by a legal regime of management 
discretion than shareholder choice.        
 
                                                 
† The authors are respectively, the Miller Friedman Professor of Finance, Wharton School and the William 
B. Johnson Professor of Law and Economics and Co-Director of the Institute for Law and Economics.  This 
paper has benefited from comments made at presentations to the NYU/Penn Conference on Law and 
Finance, the Wharton Finance Seminar Series, the Summer Finance Conference at the University of British 
Columbia, and a Department Seminar at Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.  Special thanks to Edward Rock, 
Steve Ross, Krishna Ramaswamy, Nicolae Garleanu, and Esben Eckbo for comments on an earlier draft 
and to Bonnie Clause for editorial assistance.  
1 This paper builds on Kihlstrom and Wachter (2003).  See also Wachter (2003).   
2 We use the term management discretion to refer to the Delaware legal regime that can be interpreted as 
permitting managers to maintain takeover defenses in place in the face of a hostile tender offer as long as 
those defenses are neither coercive nor preclusive.   The legal rule for Delaware corporations is developed 
in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.  See, also, Veasey 
(1997). 
3 By shareholder choice we mean a legal regime that would prevent managers from maintaining takeover 
defenses beyond a period of time that would allow them to offer an alternative to the takeover bid.  The 
shareholder choice model was first developed in the early 1980s. (Gilson, 1981; Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1981; Bebchuk, 1982).  Later articles taking this position include: Coffee, Jr., (1997); Gordon, (1997); 
Bebchuk (2002); Bebchuk et al. (2003).  The shareholder choice position can, for expositional purposes, be 
identified with the Chancery Court’s holding in City Capital Ass’n v. Interco, Inc..  According to Interco’s 
reasoning, target management could use its poison pill to hold off the immediate clutches of an unwanted 
suitor.  But the firm would eventually have to be sold, possibly to the existing management team should 
they mount a management buy-out (“MBO”), unless the shareholders could be quickly convinced to value 
the current earnings prospects of the firm more highly. 
4Gilson states “The statute, like a golem, requires an animating principle to come alive. …But Unitrin’s 
effective abandonment of Unocal’s regulatory function brings us back to the need for an animating 
justification: why should the court prefer elections to markets?” 
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5Others who have written in favor of management discretion include Lipton and Rowe (2002), Blair and 
Stout (1999); Lynn A. Stout (2002); and Bainbridge (2003).   In his original writings, Lipton  (1979) 
advocated applying the business judgment rule to decisions involving hostile tender offers.   
6 We follow the conventional definitions of strong and semi-strong-form efficiency (Campbell et al., 1997; 
Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2006).  
7 Deviations from strong-form efficiency undercut the rational for the efficiency of a shareholder choice 
legal regime.  In our model, market efficiency is needed to secure the main benefit of shareholder choice; 
namely using the market for control as a device to discipline managers by reducing their private benefits 
and by encouraging them to adopt value-enhancing corporate policies.  If markets become strong-form 
efficient in the context of a takeover battle, then all transactions are value enhancing to shareholders.   If 
this is not the case and managers have superior information to the market, then the firms that are taken are 
not those that have high agency costs, but instead are those that are inefficiently priced.  In this case, the 
threat of takeovers does not encourage managers to minimize their private benefits, rather the threat 
encourages them to manage to the financial markets, even when their own superior information suggests an 
alternative policy. 
8 § 141(a) states that “The business and affairs of every corporation … shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors” Delaware General Corporation Law.  Under Delaware case law, the 
business judgment rule is … a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis; in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
the best interests of the company.  Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the 
courts.  The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.” 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).   
9 The resolution to the classical dilemma is a settled matter of law in the case of ordinary business 
judgments.  In such cases the business judgment rule provides a highly deferential rule that gives directors 
extensive authority to decide on corporate policies without challenge from disgruntled shareholders.   Few 
commentators disagree, and would assign greater discretion to shareholders to choose the appropriate 
corporate policy.  The dilemma is far from being resolved appropriately in the case where a hostile bidder 
appears who is willing to buy the shares of the corporation above the existing market price.  If the bid 
succeeds, the directors lose their jobs and private benefits.   
10 This point was suggested by Stephen Ross in a seminar where our paper was presented. 
11 Our model does not have a specific “takeover” period so that we cannot focus on this assumption rather 
than the more general assumption that strong-form efficiency always holds.     
12 As discussed below, we define private benefits as the component of managers’ compensation that is 
above the opportunity pay of the managers.   
13 “In particular, long-term contracts executed under conditions of uncertainty are ones for which complete 
presentation is apt to be prohibitively costly if not impossible.  Problems of several kinds arise. First, not all 
future contingencies for which adaptations are required can be anticipated at the outset.” (Williamson, 
1979). 
14 Kihlstrom and Wachter (2003).  In this, we follow Hart (1989) who views the firm as a set of property 
rights including asset ownership and residual control rights.  See, also Rock and Wachter (2001). 
15 Strictly speaking, the managers’ compensation includes their opportunity wage, and this component may 
be part of b and/or part of s.  For simplicity, however, we will assume that b does not include an 
opportunity wage component. 
16 In Kihlstrom and Wachter (2003), we addressed the case where managers actually make investments in 
policy options that are out-of-the-money in a PV sense because making the investment reduced the 
probability of a takeover.  We could have allowed for this possibility in this paper, but there is no loss in 
generality by omitting that possibility in the current model.      
17 In saying this we are not taking a position as to whether poison pills are, on balance, positive or negative 
with respect to shareholders wealth.  Our only point is that the gains to shareholders in a potentially higher 
price in a takeover will be offset to some extent by an increase in the private benefits that managers will be 
able to extract if they are maximizing their own compensation.   
18 This topic was first addressed in the important paper by Gilson and Schwartz (2001). 
19 In industries with several firms that produce homogeneous products that are sold in the same product 
market, shareholders may learn of missed investment opportunities by analyzing the investment choices of 
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the other firms in the industry.  Hence, the appeal of our argument is likely to vary among industries.  We 
do not analyze the industry-specific issue in this paper. 
20 In the Arlen and Talley (2003) model, managers decide whether to continue with their current strategy or 
to switch to an alterative strategy that involves investing in an asset that must be sold if a takeover occurs. 
The alternative investment is sometimes more valuable than the firm’s current operations and sometimes 
less valuable. The manager decides whether to make the investment knowing if the new investment is more 
or less valuable than the firm’s current operations. Under management discretion the manager always make 
the investment decision preferred by shareholders, but under shareholder choice the manager sometimes 
chooses to make the investment when the shareholders prefer the continuation of current operations.  The 
manager misbehaves in this way because he desires the protection from a hostile bid provided by the fact 
that the asset has to be sold when a takeover takes place.   
21 Case law has continually emphasized the foundational role of § 141 that gives the directors and their 
appointed managers the power and responsibility for conducting the business and affairs of the corporation.  
The directors’ fiduciary duties are a “constant compass,” and any abdication of those responsibilities is 
rejected.  This provides the foundation for a host of court ruling including the restrictions on dead-hand 
poison pills to the perceived delegation of the right to sale the company to a controlling shareholder or 
CEO.   For example, in Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., then Vice Chancellor Jack Jacobs concluded that a 
deadhand poison pill interferes with the director’s statutory power to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation.  Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1190 (Del Ch. 1998).  The Delaware Supreme 
Court, stating that directors have an “unremitting obligation” to meet their statutory obligations under 
141(a) struck down a “delayed redemption provision” as being in violation of fundamental principles of 
Delaware law.  Quickturn Design Systems Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).   
22 One commentator has said that our defense of management discretion is akin to justifying a “protection 
racket,” in that we are giving managers more power to deter them from doing something really harmful 
otherwise.  But the analogy does not work.  Under management discretion, managers are not being paid off 
and only gain to the extent they maximize the value of the firm.  The problem only arises under shareholder 
choice.  Favoring management discretion thus follows the traditional principle of favoring the legal rule 
that best aligns the interests of director/managers and shareholders.    
23 In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly distinguished between the intrinsic 
value of a corporation and its market value as determined in a financial market.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  Van Gorkom, the CEO of TransUnion, offered to sell the company to Jay Pritsker, a 
leveraged buyout specialist, for $55 per share.  The stock had been trading between the low 20s and upper 
30s.  The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the board of directors was inadequately informed when 
they approved the agreement, and they should have actively solicited alternative bids once they decided to 
sell the company.   In the appraisal law context, the courts have limited the role that market prices can 
apply in determining the fair value of a company.   
24 Our early papers are more consistent with the case law in assuming that managers may have better 
ongoing information as to the true value of the firm than do the shareholders.  Wachter (2003) and 
Kihlstrom and Wachter (2003) 
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